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Item:  BSL - 1810 BERESFORD AT COIMBRA

MARSHAL GENERAL WILLIAM CARR BERESFORD, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PORTUGUESE FORCES, WRITES A TWELVE PAGE LETTER FROM COIMBRA

"THE ABLEST MAN I HAVE YET SEEN WITH THIS ARMY" SAID WELLINGTON IN 1812

AN EXEMPLARY AND ELEGANT EXPOSITION OF THE CASE OF A BRITISH GENERAL OFFICER CALLED TO LEAD A FOREIGN ARMY AND AN IMPORTANT BERESFORD LETTER AS HE WRESTLES WITH JUSTICE, PREJUDICE, POLITICS AND "TO KEEP THE MACHINE GOING WITH CORRECTNESS"

"THOSE WHO HAVING REQUESTED A BRITISH GENERAL OFFICER, ONE WOULD HAVE IMAGINED WOULD HAVE ALMOST IMPLICITLY CONFIDED IN WHAT HE PROPOSED" EXTREMELY FINE 12 PAGE ALS FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE PORTUGUESE FORCES

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Transcription:


Coimbra 24 April, 1810

My Dear Sir,

     I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th Inst. (this month) and by what you state relative to Mr. Forjas’s opinion, and which was what I expected, on the forms of Courts Martial in this Country, I can not expect that any representations of mine to the government here can be of the slightest effect, as to it I have already urged the subject with much earnestness, but unsuccessfully, and indeed from experience I have
found the utmost repugnance to any change in former laws, or even of forms, that are no essential Parts of the Law. Tho’ in the courts either to Evade the Law or Judge in direct opposition to it is very customary and rouses no feelings of indignation in any one, and thus tho’ there is an alarm about correcting the forms to be more correspondent to the necessities of the times, there is no sensation felt that the Cases themselves are scarcely ever acted up to. The arrangements since which have Effected the change in the state and discipline of the Army, tho’ not opposed, were far from meeting the hearty concurrence of those who having requested a British General Officer, one would have imagined would have almost implicitly confided in what he proposed, that had only military regulations and objects in him, but in spite of the strong desire on that quarter that the Army should be put into the best possible state, yet besides perhaps a little regret for lost Patronage & a little jealousy, there has existed an alarm at striking at once at the Root of Evils, and even whilst the Enemy was in the Kingdom, and that we might have expected to be interrupted in our work by him, even then when every moment was precious, as indeed it has been all along & still continues so, it was urged to me not to proceed with haste but to reform by degrees, and tho’ as I have stated there never has been any decided opposition to my measures, yet the difficulties, the vexations & the impediments I have had to encounter few can conceive; that however they are in a great degree surmounted is very certain but not less so, that to keep the machine going with correctness, there is much yet to be done, or at least to be persevered in, and as much of the Cause of my difficulties has been this idea, or fear, either real or pretended, of wounding deep seated prejudices, until that Principle is given up we can not expect to do all the good that can be done. This Pretence if real is from fear, and I can assert that fear to be totally groundless, as far as regards the great body of the nation, with whom there is no Prejudice in favour of the Legal forms of their country, they never expected Justice thru’ that channel and were seldom disappointed.
     The Forms & Mode of proceeding in Courts Martial are peculiarly formed to exude Justice, and to Cause delay, and at all events, as from this last is prevented, the immediate example, so necessary in Military Cases,
the effects wished to be desired from punishments are lost, & those not attained the infliction becomes a cruelty. It is impossible to doubt that the forms of proceedings in courts martial as now practiced are by no means adapted to times of trouble and strong emergencies, so much the contrary that during the Common movement of an Army it is totally impracticable to hold a court martial. Mr Forjas it is certain may assure, apart, and reason to them there is no necessity that so much delay should occur in the proceedings of courts martial, for what can avail his arguments in the very front of experience? And he would do much better if he would prove it by a matter of fact, and point out any court martial that he ever recollects to have finished in the course of one day. I have now had more than 12 months experience and tho’ I have not been sparing in the means of obliging the auditors & members of courts martial to be more expeditious & have perhaps in some degree succeeded, yet courts martial continue to last 6 weeks, two & even three months, nay even six, and it is not unusual for the Proceedings on a Private Soldier to be so voluminous as would take a single person probably a Fortnight to Copy.
     The Plea of deep rooted Prejudice is quite unfounded, it can in the case in point exist but with the Law people, who are certainly very prejudiced in favour of the Routine they have ever trod in, and very averse to any change and particularly to one that simplifies, but it is the greatest injustice to this nation to say it is averse to a change in the mode of administering the Law, either Civil or Military.
     If we do not hear spoken loudly, we hear whispered very generally the approbation of this action to every energetic and firm measure when consonant to Justice and the great object of saving the nation from the grip of the Enemy, and
the People consider very little if the measure was or not conformable to former Rules, they only look to see if it has been administered with the same measure to the Hidalgos & the remaining orders in the nation, when whatever it is, it is certain of making general approbation and that the assertion of deep rooted prejudices being averse to change is quite without any foundation will be sufficiently evident by the past, that where English Officers are in Command of Provinces or wherever they command all is quiet, obedient, and satisfied, and perhaps this may prove that Prejudices lean the direct opposite way to what is stated. It is certain that in Lisbon, much of what is calculated Prejudice must and does exist, because there is the great gathering of the People of the Law, and the entire Junta of the Nobility and High Hidalgos and the latter will never willingly submit that they are to have for themselves & for their dependents, but the bare protection of the Law and equal with the other subjects of the state, and it is by these latter mentioned orders that the conduct of the government is very much directed, and the feelings, desires or prejudices of the great body of the nation is but very little taken into consideration and I regret very much to state that the Protection of any of the considerable Families of the Kingdom, has much more influence than public opinion.
     You are fully acquainted with my sentiments of the excellent intention of the Government & of Mr Forjas, for the success of the General Cause. They have themselves many difficulties to struggle with and if former habits & ways of thinking intrigues and prejudices are taken into consideration, the support I have with, will be rather a subject for admiration and approbation, than for complaint, and the obstructions I have met with will have
proceeded from timidity on the part of Mr Forjas or the Government, but the cause of this timidity is not praise worthy, as it has never certainly been from any dread of offending the great body of the nation, it has originated in the dread of offending or hurting the pride and prejudices of the Hidalgos.
     To return to the subject of courts martial, and what brought me to the consideration of that subject, the intention of the Government to adopt and proclaim military law in case of an Invasion, I must repeat that I can see no possible use in it whilst the present forms in courts martial exist, and tho’ whatever is entrusted to me for the Public Good I will do my utmost to effect, yet it is not less a justice to the Common Cause than to myself to declare whilst there is time for a remedy, that the adoption of Military Law will be a nugatory measure under the actual forms & modes of proceeding under that Law; and it will be unnecessary to give to military law /which only a case of necessity & a good to be desired from it can warrant/ what will just as well be executed by the Civil, as the consideration of crimes must in either case be postponed ‘till a period of tranquility when the Civil Courts may assume their jurisdiction, and I have before communicated to you that during any active operations it is impossible to bring even our own Common Military Crimes to be judged by a courts martial.
I am going tomorrow to Vizeu and shall speak on this subject to Lord Wellington who however I scarcely suppose will meddle in such a subject. I shall return again in three or four days & shall be glad to hear there will be a prospect of seeing you here. Believe me very truly yours.

                                                   W. C. Beresford
To His Excellency
Chas Stuart

Mr Forjas was Dr. Miguel Pereira Forjas, Beresford's predecessor in attempting to reform the Army and later the primary military liaison with Wellington on behalf of the Junta, the People of Law, the Hidalgos and the absent Royal Court which had relocated to Buenos Aires for the duration of the War. The Hidalgos were the landed nobility class of Portugal. An interesting reference to the management of the army as a "Machine", an early use of the concept of the "war machine" from an early date of the Industrial Revolution.

 

Biographical Note

MARSHAL GENERAL WILLIAM CARR BERESFORD, VISCOUNT BERESFORD, BARON OF ALBUERA, COUNT OF TRANSCOSO, MARQUIS OF CAMPO MAJOR, GCB GCH
 (1768-1854)

British general and Portuguese marshal, illegitimate son of the first Marquess of Waterford, was born on the 2nd of October 1768. He entered the British army in 1785, and while in Nova Scotia with his regiment in the following year lost the sight of one eye by a shooting accident. He first distinguished himself at Toulon in 1793, receiving two years later the command of the 88th regiment (Connaught Rangers). In 1799 his regiment was ordered to India, and a few months later Beresford left with Sir David Baird's expedition for Egypt, and was placed in command of the first brigade which led the march from Kosseir across the desert. When, on the evacuation of Egypt in 1803, he returned home, his reputation was established. In 1805 he accompanied Sir David Baird to South Africa, and was present at the capture of Cape Town and the surrender of the colony. From South Africa he was despatched to South America. He had little difficulty in capturing Buenos Aires with only a couple of regiments. But this force was wholly insufficient to hold the colony. Under the leadership of a French ex-patriot in Spanish service, the chevalier Jacques de Liniers, the colonists attacked Beresford, and at the end of three days' hard fighting he was compelled to capitulate. After six months' imprisonment he escaped, and reached England in 1807, and at the end of that year he was sent to Madeira, occupying the island in the name of the king of Portugal. After six months in Madeira as governor and commander-in-chief, during which he learnt Portuguese and obtained an insight into the Portuguese character, he was ordered to join Sir Arthur Wellesley's army in Portugal. He was first employed as commandant in Lisbon, but accompanied Sir John Moore on the advance into Spain, and took a conspicuous part in the battle of Corunna. In February 1809 Beresford was given the task of reorganizing the Portuguese army. In this task, by systematic weeding-out of inefficient officers and men, he succeeded beyond expectation. By the summer of 1810 he had so far improved the moral and discipline of the force that Wellington brigaded some of the Portuguese regiments with English ones, and at Busaco Portuguese and English fought side by side. Beresford's services in this battle were rewarded by the British government with a knighthood of the Bath (GCB) and the Portuguese with a peerage, Conde de Trancoso (Count of Trancoso).
     In the spring of 1811 Wellington was compelled to detach Beresford from the Portuguese service. The latter was next in seniority to General (Lord) Hill who had gone home on sick leave, and on him, therefore, the command of Hill's corps now devolved. He commanded at Campo Mayor and invested Badajoz but with insufficient forces, and on the advance of Soult, was compelled to raise the siege and offer battle at Albuera where his personal courage was even more than usually conspicuous. In this notable action Beresford held an independent command of a combined Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish army under his command as a Portuguese Field-Marshal. He intercepted the relieving French Army commanded by Marshal Nicolas Soult who had been ordered by Marshal Auguste Marmont to move to protect Badajoz. After the bloody Battle of Albuera the French were forced to retreat.
     Beresford then went back to his work of reorganizing the Portuguese army. He was present at the battle of Salamanca, where he was severely wounded (1812). In 1813 he was present at the battle of Vitoria, and at the battles of the Pyrenees, while at the battle of the Nivelle, the Nive and Orthez he commanded the British centre, and later he led a corps at the battle of Toulouse. At the close of the Peninsular War he was created Baron Beresford of Albuera and Cappoquin, with a pension of £2000 a year by the British and Marquis of Campo Major by the Portuguese. He continued as the Marshal General of the Portuguese Army until 1819 and then returned home. On arriving in England he turned his attention to politics, and strongly supported the Duke of Wellington in the House of Lords. In 1823 his Barony was made a Viscounty, and when the Duke of Wellington formed his first cabinet in 1828 he gave Beresford the office of Master-General of the Ordnance. In 1830 Beresford retired from politics, and for some time subsequently he was occupied in a heated controversy with William Napier, the historian of the Peninsular War, who had severely criticized his tactics at Albuera. On this subject Wellington's opinion of Beresford is to the point. The duke went so far as to declare, during the Peninsular War, that, in the event of his own death, he would recommend Beresford to succeed him. The last years of Beresford's life were spent at Bedgebury, Kent, where he had purchased a country estate. He died on the 8th of January 1854. He was the last titular Governor of Jersey; since his death the Crown has been represented in Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor of Jersey.
[excerpts from 1911 Encylopaedia Britannica, Glover's The Peninsular War,

Document Specifications:  An extremely very fine handwritten ALS letter signed by William Carr Beresford as Commander in Chief of the Portuguese Army in Coimbra and dated April 24th 1810. Folded letter measures 9¼" tall x 7¼" wide (236mm x 185mm). On three folded sheets (forming twelve pages) of gilt-edged, heavy cream stock, batonne laid paper, watermarked "GATER 1807", with a partial tear in the fold of one sheet and minor edge toning along the bottom, not affecting any writing. Writing on twelve pages as shown.  This is a beautiful, extensive, handwritten letter by the Field Marshall of the Portuguese Forces as he attempts to resolve the contradictions "of those who having requested a British General Officer, one would have imagined would have almost implicitly confided in what he proposed". Here is an excellent opportunity an example of his hand and signature which would handsomely enhance and help anchor a collection of Peninsular War Letters. Beresford's autograph letters are more scarce than Wellington's in the market place. From the Stuart Correspondence.

 Offered by Berryhill & Sturgeon, Ltd

End of Item - BSL - 1810 Beresford Coimbra

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